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Abstract
Notwithstanding the considerable amount of progress that
has been made in recent years, the parallel fields of
cognitive science and cognitive systems lack a unifying
methodology for describing, understanding, simulating
and implementing advanced cognitive behaviours. Grow‐
ing interest in ’enactivism’ - as pioneered by the Chilean
biologists Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela - may
lead to new perspectives in these areas, but a common
framework for expressing many of the key concepts is still
missing. This paper attempts to lay a tentative foundation
in that direction by extending Maturana and Varela’s
pictographic depictions of autopoietic unities to create a
rich visual language for envisioning a wide range of
enactive systems - natural or artificial - with different
degrees of complexity. It is shown how such a diagram‐
matic taxonomy can help in the comprehension of impor‐
tant relationships between a variety of complex concepts
from a pan-theoretic perspective. In conclusion, it is
claimed that visual language is not only valuable for
teaching and learning, but also offers important insights
into the design and implementation of future advanced
robotic systems.
Keywords Cognitive Science, Cognitive Systems, Robotics,
Enaction, Visual Taxonomy, Pictographic Language
1. Introduction
Of the many difficulties faced by researchers in the parallel
fields of cognitive science and cognitive systems, by far the
most challenging is the sheer complexity of the entities
being studied [1]. Even the simplest living organism
or ’intelligent’ autonomous agent is composed of a multi‐
tude of interconnected systems and subsystems, all of
which are required to operate in such a way that appropri‐
ately organized (and effective) behaviours emerge. It is
perhaps for these reasons that contemporary knowledge
and solutions in this area inhabit a rich and varied concep‐
tual space supported by a multitude of theoretical stances,
empirical evidence, design architectures and technical
implementations, which can be hard to relate to each other.
This means that progress in our understanding, simulation
and realization of advanced cognitive behaviours may be
hampered by a lack of coherence at the meta-theoretical
level [2].
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These issues have been addressed by both fields, resulting
in what seems to be broad agreement with respect to the
capabilities that proposed models of natural and artificial
cognitive systems should exhibit - capabilities such as
categorization, understanding, action selection, problem-
solving, knowledge representation, joint action, communi‐
cation, emotion and adaptation [3, 4, 5, 6]. There is also
common support for approaches that stress the importance
of embodiment and situatedness [7, 8]; in particular, there
is growing interest in the potential of enactivism [9, 10] to
provide a new perspective for cognitive systems [11, 12, 13,
14].
1.1 Enactivism
The term ’enactive’ was proposed by the Chilean biologist
Francisco Varela (in the Afterword of his seminal book The
Tree of Knowledge [9], co-authored with his close colleague
Humberto Maturana) to designate a novel view of ’knowl‐
edge’ in living systems. In Maturana and Varela’s frame‐
work, living beings are defined as autonomous, continually
self-producing (’autopoietic’) unities, where behaviour is
seen as a joint construct of an organism and its environ‐
ment. Cognition is said to be based on the operational
closure of an organism’s nervous system and is viewed as
effective action (as expressed in their well-known sim‐
ile ”knowing is doing” [9] p248).
Varela made it clear that the enactive approach was not
anti-representational; rather, that an organism and its
environment were two sides of the same coin. The enactive
concept of knowledge - ”what is known is brought forth” ([9]
p255) - is, therefore, interestingly different from the
classical cognitive or connectionist views.
1.2 A way forward?
While enactivism appears to provide a compelling frame‐
work for future progress across the fields of cognitive
science and cognitive systems, what is still missing is a
common language for expressing many of the key concepts
involved. This paper attempts to lay a tentative foundation
in that direction by taking inspiration from arguably one of
the more incidental aspects of Maturana and Varela’s work
- their use of a series of simple pictographic devices to
illustrate various stages of organizational complexity for
autopoietic unities (see Section 2).
This paper shows how Maturana and Varela’s original
diagrammatic approach may be extended to create a rich
visual taxonomy for envisioning a wide range of enactive
systems with different degrees of complexity - even for
systems that are not autopoietic. Originally developed for
teaching purposes, it is shown herein how such a diagram‐
matic language can serve to both clarify and unify a diverse
array of relevant topics from a pan-theoretic perspective,
arguing that such an approach could pave the way towards
a deeper cross-disciplinary understanding of some of the
complex concepts involved.
2. Maturana and Varela’s Pictograms
2.1 First-order autopoietic unities
As mentioned in Section 1.1, the key to Maturana and
Varela’s thinking was the concept of autopoiesis as a
fundamental self-regulating mechanism for maintaining
the organizational integrity of a living organism1 - referred
to as a ’unity’. For example, a self-maintaining boundary
(such as a membrane) serves to create a persistency of
structure (such as a single-celled animal), which Maturana
and Varela termed a ’first-order autopoietic unity’. Their
idea was that such a unity functions with ’operational
closure’ and, therefore, defines that which is internal and
that which is external in the context of continuous interac‐
tion between the unity and its surrounding environment.
These fundamental concepts were illustrated (on p74 of [9])
using a simple pictogram (as shown in Figure 1).
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Figure 1. Maturana and Varela’s pictogram for a self-maintaining first-order
autopoietic unity and its coupling with its external environment (as
illustrated on p74 of [9]). The circle represents an organism’s boundary (for
example, a membrane), the solid arrow on the circle represents the
organism’s dynamics (that is, its metabolism), the wavy line represents the
organism’s external environment and the double arrows represent the
coupled interaction between the organism and its environment.
2.2 Second-order unities
Having defined (and illustrated) the essential properties of
first-order autopoietic unities, Maturana and Varela went
on to ask what would happen if two (or more) unities co-
existed in the same neighbourhood. In this situation, non-
destructive recurrent interaction between the unities
would itself constitute a form of structural coupling,
leading to two possible outcomes: the inclusion of one unity
within the boundary of another (a symbiotic arrangement)
or a mutual dependency between the individual unities
(giving rise to a metacellular unity). Maturana and Varela
termed these assemblies ’second-order autopoietic uni‐
1 Note that ’autopoiesis’ (the maintenance of system organization) is related to, but not the same as, ’homeostasis’ (the maintenance of system state).
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ties’2 and again illustrated the concepts using simple
pictograms (as shown in Figure 2).
METACELLULAR	  
ORGANISM	  
SYMBIOTIC	  
ORGANISM	  
ORGANISM	   ORGANISM	  
Figure 2. Maturana and Varela’s depiction of second-order symbiotic and
metacellular autopoietic unities formed from structural coupling between
first-order unities
Maturana and Varela observed that the natural world
contains a vast array of complex organisms whose organi‐
zational structures may be viewed as the result of structural
coupling between first-order autopoietic unities. However,
they noted that one particular multicellular arrangement -
a neural assembly - was of special interest due to a neuron’s
ability to create long-range dependencies by coupling non-
adjacent cells. As a result, they defined an organism that
possessed a central nervous system as a ’second-order
cognitive unity’, illustrating it by using a simple modifica‐
tion to the original first-order pictogram: see Figure 3.
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Figure 3. Maturana and Varela’s depiction of a second-order cognitive unity.
The outer circle represents an organism’s boundary (as before) and the inner
ellipse represents its central nervous system (with solid arrows to signify
that Maturana and Varela considered that it also functioned with opera‐
tional closure).
2.3 Third-order systems
Maturana and Varela employed their notion of second-
order cognitive unities to discuss the behaviours of a wide
range of organisms, from the relatively simple (such as
hydra) to the very complex (such as human beings). They
noted that the possession of a nervous system opened up
radical new forms of structural coupling between organ‐
isms, illustrating such ’third-order coupling’ as shown in
Figure 4.
ENVIRONMENT	  
ORGANISM	   ORGANISM	  
Figure 4. Maturana and Varela’s depiction of third-order coupling between
cognitive unities
Maturana and Varela observed that third-order coupling
between cognitive unities gives rise to an impressive array
of advanced interactive behaviours, such as coordination,
communication, social systems and language. However,
they did not present any further developments of their
pictograms to illustrate such arrangements.
2.4 Impact and wider implications
Maturana and Varela’s simple pictograms have enjoyed
some modest popularity as illustrative devices. Maturana
himself employed several variants of the pictogram shown
in Figure 1 to represent various physiological and behav‐
ioural domains in a paper on structural drift in evolution‐
ary development [15]. Likewise, a few authors have used
the pictograms to illustrate the self-organized autonomous
nature of a cognitive system [3]; they have even found their
way into textbooks on management techniques [16].
However, the diagrams have essentially remained as
presented in The Tree of Knowledge [9], with only limited
development having subsequently taken place.
Nevertheless, by virtue of their continued usage, Maturana
and Varela’s pictograms have shown themselves to be
compelling representational devices for capturing the
essence of cognitive entities. Notwithstanding their
extreme simplicity (almost trivializing the issues involved),
the pictograms succeed in focusing attention on aspects of
organization and behaviour that are relevant to both
cognitive science and cognitive systems. However, there
are many critical concepts that the original diagrams do not
2 Maturana and Varela prevaricated as to whether metacellular systems themselves constitute first-order autopoietic systems. However, as they affirmed that
such configurations do have operational closure, they proposed that the pictogram shown in Figure 1 could also be used to depict a cellular or a multicellular
autopoietic unity.
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capture. Maturana and Varela’s pictograms, therefore,
represent an inspiring starting point for the creation of a
much richer visual language.
3. Towards an Enhanced Visual Language
3.1 Natural versus artificial systems
The concept of a ’unity’ - an autonomous organizational
system structure - is central to the ideas presented thus far,
while Maturana and Varela’s use of smooth circles and
ellipses to represent natural systems may be appropriately
complemented by the use of angular squares and rectangles
to represent artificial systems - machines (see Figure 5). This
apparently simple extension immediately offers an impor‐
tant insight: the circles depicting unities in Figures 1-4
incorporate solid arrows to signify that the natural system
organization is autopoietic (self-maintaining). Whilst many
artificial systems aim to achieve autonomy using homeo‐
stasis [17, 18], very few machines are autopoietic, i.e.,
capable of self-repair [19, 20], which is a potential require‐
ment for a fully autonomous system that is often over‐
looked. Most existing machines are ’allopoietic’ and thus
do not warrant the inclusion of the arrow. Hence, the power
of the pictographic representations to isolate and identify
important system characteristics is immediately apparent.
Following the same line of argument, the embedding of a
central  nervous  system  within  a  living  organism  (as
illustrated in Figure 3) inevitably lends itself to an analo‐
gous arrangement, whereby an artificial neural network (or
some other artificial means of achieving cognition) might be
embedded within a machine body (as shown in Figure 5c).
A ’cognitive robot’ would, of course, be an example of such
an artificial cognitive unity. However, it is important to
appreciate that the ability to draw such an object does not
imply that it exists. Rather, the pictograms clarify the
characteristics that would need to be exhibited by an
artificial system for it to be properly termed an embodied
cognitive robot [21, 22].
MACHINE	  
SELF-­‐REPAIRING	  
MACHINE	  
COGNITIVE	  
MACHINE	  
(a)	  
(b)	  
(c)	  
Figure 5. Proposed pictograms for artificial systems of differing complexity:
(a) a machine, (b) a machine that is capable of self-repair and (c) a cognitive
machine (also capable of self-repair)
3.2 Hybrid systems
Having established the basic visual vocabulary of using
smooth circles and ellipses to depict natural systems, and
angular squares and rectangles to depict artificial systems,
it is immediately possible to conceive of hybrid configura‐
tions in which natural and artificial systems are combined
in various symbiotic ways. Electromechanical prostheses
for living organisms (such as a false limb or a replacement
organ) are, of course, well-established artefacts, but the
inverse idea of combining living tissue with a machine is
much more futuristic [23]. Indeed, one only has to turn to
the genre of science fiction to discover an astonishing array
of symbiotic possibilities. For example, a cognitive machine
embedded within a living host (such as the Borg in Star
Trek) or a cognitive organism embedded in a machine body
(such as a Cyberman from the BBC TV series Doctor Who)
are both examples of a ’cyborg’. Likewise, it is possible to
envisage the possibility of neural prostheses in either
direction: artificial neural structures embedded in a living
brain (to provide extra memory, for example) or natural
neural structures embedded in an artificial brain. Some of
these hybrid arrangements are illustrated in Figure 6.
ARTIFICIAL	  PROSTHETIC	  
CYBORG	  
BIOLOGICAL	  IMPLANT	  
CYBORG	  
(a)	  
(c)	  
(b)	  
(d)	  
Figure 6. Proposed pictograms for a range of symbiotic natural and artificial
hybrid systems: (a) a biological cognitive system with an artificial prosthetic,
(b) a cognitive machine with a biological implant, (c) a biological nervous
system embedded in a machine body and (d) an artificial cognitive system
embedded in a biological body
Many of the configurations described in the foregoing are
indeed in the realms of science fiction. Nevertheless, it is
clear that even these first primitive steps towards the
development of a visual language are successfully laying
bare the conceptual space of possibilities in a clear and
concise manner. Indeed, even stepping away from the
futuristic scenarios posited by science fiction and back to
the reality of contemporary media, the approach being
taken here again points towards potentially important
insights. For example, the reality of Star Trek is that an
advanced humanoid robot, such as Mr Data, is, of course,
portrayed by a human actor: Brent Spiner. In this case, the
actor is passing himself off as a cognitive machine, which
has the outward appearance of a human being but with
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non-human skin tone and behaviours. This raises two
related issues: (i) the notion that a ’costume’ (or ’skin’) can
be used to change the appearance of an entity and (ii) the
concept of an appearance that is a hybrid between a
machine and a living system. Pictographically, the first can
be represented by the addition of an outer layer with a gap
signifying that it is wrapped around the entity as a cover‐
ing, while the second can be represented by a shape that is
part way between a circle and a square. These hybrid
configurations are shown in Figure 7.
(a)	  
(d)	   (e)	   (f)	  
(b)	   (c)	  
Figure 7. Proposed pictograms for a range of hybrid arrangements
involving ’costumes’ (or ’skins’): an actor portraying themselves as (a)
another person, (b) a machine and (c) an android; and a cognitive machine
configured to portray itself as (d) a living system, (e) a different machine and
(f) an android
These extensions to the pictographic language reveal a
combinatorial set of possible symbiotic configurations in
which human beings portray themselves as other human
beings (such as Dustin Hoffman’s character in the film
Tootsie), as a machine (such as the wizard in the film The
Wizard of Oz) or as an android robot (such as Kryton in the
TV series Red Dwarf), while machines portray themselves
as facsimiles of living organisms (such as a dog in the case
of Sony’s Aibo), as androids (such as Honda’s Azimo or the
RobotCub Consortium’s iCub [24]) or as an actual human
being (such as Geminoid F [25]).
3.3 Two-way coupling
After the notion of an autopoietic unity, arguably the
second most important aspect of Maturana and Varela’s
basic pictograms is the connectivity between a unity and its
external environment (which includes other unities). In
particular, Maturana and Varela point out the importance
of continuous recurrent interactions in establishing a
structural coupling between unities or between a unity and
its environment. They illustrated such interactions by using
arrows representing two-way reciprocal perturbations (as
in Figures 1-4), but they did not tease out the topological
implications of such connectivity.
Clearly, the collective behaviour of a community of unities
depends on the connectivity between the individual
unities. If all unities are coupled to one central unity (as in
an insect colony), then the emergent behaviour is going to
be very different from that which arises in the situation
where unities are coupled to their nearest neighbours (as
in a flock of birds). Such alternative configurations are
relatively easily expressed in diagrammatic form; Figure
8 illustrates a selection of basic topological arrangements,
each of which will have different consequences for the
emergent behaviour.
(a)	  
(d)	   (e)	   (f)	  
(b)	   (c)	   FULLY	  CONNECTED	   CLUSTERED	  
CHAIN	  
LOOP	  
GO-­‐BETWEEN	   MONARCHY	  
HIERARCHY	  
Figure 8. Illustration of alternative topologies for connectivity within a
community of cognitive agents
The alternative network topologies illustrated in Figure 8
are clearly helpful in clarifying the differences that can
emerge in the collective behaviours of swarms, flocks,
groups, crowds and societies3. Of course, many other
configurations are possible, including connectivity that
changes dynamically. The key outcome here is that the
proposed visual framework clearly provides a mechanism
for focusing attention on the implications of alternative
topological arrangements, while the pictograms help to
clarify the issues involved, whether it is for modelling the
3 Note that these principles are equally applicable to the internal dynamics of multicellular organisms, not just to the external dynamics of communities of
cognitive agents.
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behaviour of natural systems or for instantiating required
behaviour in artificial systems (for example, in the field of
swarm robotics [26, 27]).
3.4 One-way information flow
The foregoing sections have treated interactivity as a two-
way structural coupling between unities (or between unities
and their environments); for a cognitive unity, these are
essentially ’perception-action loops’. However, in reality,
such a reciprocal arrangement is a particular case; a more
general approach should accommodate the possibility of
one-way connections (that is, potentially information-
bearing signals), which are easily represented diagrammat‐
ically through the use of a single arrow in place of the
double arrow used hitherto. As a consequence of this
simple step, a distinction can now be made between
interactive behaviours that are often the subject of much
confusion - those which emerge from the one-way flow of
information (which facilitate phenomena that may be
characterized as the consequence of ’stimulus-response’
or ’cause-and-effect’ conditions), and those which emerge
from two-way coupling (which exhibit phenomena such
as ’synchrony’, ’coordination’ or ’co-action’) - see Figure 9.
!""#$%&'(%"&)!"*+,%&-)
!"..*&%!'(%"&)
Figure 9. Illustration of the difference between the alignment consequences
of two-way connectivity (such as the synchronization that emerges between
metronomes, which are coupled through a shared physical environment,
and coordinated joint action between two agents) and the communicative
consequences of one-way connectivity (such as ants laying down phero‐
mone trails in a shared physical environment)
Acknowledgement of the possibility of a one-way infor‐
mation flow leads to another valuable insight: the differ‐
ence between the active/intentional sending or receiving of
a signal and the passive/unintentional sending or receiving
of a signal. For example, all unities radiate information by
giving off heat, reflecting light, making sound, leaving
deposits, disturbing the environment and so on. These are
passive/unintentional signals that, nevertheless, may have
some significance for another unity; for example, a predator
may use such information to target its prey or a prey may
use such information to avoid a predator. On the other
hand, a unity may actively generate such signals specifi‐
cally in order to influence the behaviour of another unity
or it may actively seek to receive such signals specifically
in order to maintain awareness of salient activities. Both of
these can be viewed as intentional, with the former corre‐
sponding to ’communicative’ behaviour and the latter
corresponding to ’attentional’ behaviour. All of these
important, yet subtle, distinctions may be readily captured
in the visual language being developed here through the
simple expedient of depicting active/intentional signals
using an arrow drawn with a solid line, as well as depicting
passive/unintentional signals using an arrow drawn with
a dotted line - see Figure 10.
!"##$%&'(")$"*$+,'
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Figure 10. Examples of omnidirectional one-way signals: passive radiation
(for example, a chemical pheromone being given off, which has the effect of
attracting a mate), passive sensing (for example, a plant’s sensitivity to
ambient temperature), active broadcast (for example, a bird’s alarm call) and
active sensing (for example, a fish monitoring an electric field)
Furthermore, since an arrow naturally suggests direction‐
ality, it is straightforward to capture the difference between
omnidirectional broadcasting/sensing and directional
monocasting/sensing - see Figure 11. Of course, just
because a unity employs directional signalling, there is no
implication that there is an identified receiver. Likewise,
just because a unity is employing directional receiving,
there is no implication that there is an identified sender.
Such intentional behaviours are indeed communicative or
attentional, but the establishment of a connection between
sender and receiver is not guaranteed. For example, a
sender’s behaviour might be intentional and directed, but
the intended recipient may not be in range (and vice versa).
If the signalling behaviour of a sender is intended to draw
the attention of a particular receiver (or vice versa), then the
signals can be said to be ostensive and the arrows ought to
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connect sender and receiver. This is a key point that will be
returned to in Section 3.9 when discussing language-based
interaction.
DIRECTIONAL	  
SENSING	  
DIRECTIONAL	  
SIGNALING	  
Figure 11. Examples of one-way signals: directional signalling (for example,
a physical push) and directional sensing (for example, an animal’s active use
of gaze)
3.5 Managing information flow
The foregoing takes the perspective of the sending or
receiving unity. This means that, in a community of
multiple unities, any particular signal may be active or
passive depending on whether one takes the sender’s or the
receiver’s point of view. For example, an active intentional
signal sent by one unity may or may not be picked up by
the passive sensing of another unity (as in the case where a
mating call may be treated as mere background noise by
receivers from a different species). Likewise, passive
radiation by one unity may be actively sensed by another
unity (as in the case of a predator seeking a prey). These
alternative configurations may be captured by the appro‐
priate use of solid and dotted arrows.
A number of other interesting situations emerge from this
analysis. For example, a unity might actively minimize its
radiated signals (such as a predator or prey avoiding being
seen or minimizing the generation of sounds that would
give away its position). In a similar vein, a unity might
passively mask its radiated signals (as in the fixed camou‐
flage patterns of many types of moth) or actively mask its
radiated signals (as in the dynamic camouflage exhibited
by cephalopods). Two of these possibilities are illustrated
in Figure 12.
3.6 Intentional acts
One refinement that has potentially wide-ranging implica‐
tions is to use the pictographic approach being developed
here to tease apart different types of intentional behaviour
[28]. In particular, it would seem to be important to be able
to make a distinction between behaviour that is intended
to change the state of a unity’s external environment (which
could include other unities) from behaviour that is intend‐
ed to change the state of the unity itself. For example, an
organism might probe its environment specifically in order
to determine the presence or absence of some desired
feature (such as food). In this case, the intention is to gain
information, rather than alter the world.
Likewise, it would seem to be important to be able to make
a distinction between behaviour that is intended to change
the state of the environment (or another unity) directly
versus behaviour that is intended to change the state of the
environment (or another unity) indirectly. For example, a
unity could change the state of another unity by acting
upon the environment or change the state of the environ‐
ment by acting upon another unity. In both these cases, the
intention is mediated.
These different types of behaviour may be described
as ’direct’, ’reflective’ and ’indirect’ intentional acts (which
could be actions or signals); the proposed pictographic
representations are illustrated in Figure 13.
!"#$%&'(%&'
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Figure 13. Illustration of three classes of intentional act: direct, reflective/
probing and indirect/mediating
The consequence of creating these diagrammatic represen‐
tations is that they enable distinctions to be made between
activities, such as digging a hole or moving a rock (both
examples of direct action on the physical environment),
investigating/exploring an area (an example of reflective
action on the physical environment intended to provide
information to the exploring unity) or marking out territory
(a communicative action on the physical environment
intended to have an effect on another unity). The latter is
particularly interesting, since this includes ’stigmergy’ (for
example, a method used by ants to influence each other’s
behaviour by the laying down of pheromone trails in the
!"#"$%&
'()*+,-(%.&
Figure 12. Illustration of individuals attempting to minimize radiated
information while remaining alert to potential threats by (i) hiding behind
part of the environment (with a consequent loss of sensing ability) or (ii)
passing themselves off as part of their environment using camouflage
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environment) [29]. All three configurations are illustrated
in Figure 14.
!"#$%&'
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Figure 14. Illustration of the implications of the three types of intentional
behaviour between a unity and its external environment: direct action,
reflective investigation and indirect communication
3.7 Internal representations
One of the more controversial topics in cognitive science/
systems is the issue of ’representation’ - that is, whether or
not information is retained inside a cognitive unity that, in
some sense, mirrors the information outside the unity. For
example, for an agent to navigate successfully in the world,
the representationalist view would be that the agent must
have access to an accurate model of its environment (such
as a map). This is in stark contrast to the non-representa‐
tionalist position that successful navigation (such as
obstacle avoidance) is an emergent outcome of the interac‐
tion between an agent and its environment [30].
This debate came to a head in the field of Artificial Intelli‐
gence in the late 1980s with the appearance of explicitly
non-representational ’behaviour-based robotics’ [31, 32] as
a practical4 alternative to the symbolic approach that was
typical of ’GOFAI’ (Good Old Fashioned AI) [33]. The issue
is also central to enactivism, since enaction is founded on
the key notion that organisms do not simply transform
information received from their environment into internal
representations (and vice versa). Rather, enactivism propos‐
es a perspective in which organized behaviour - and, in
turn, meaning - emerges from the dynamic coupling
between organisms and their environments (including
other organisms) [34].
It was already recognized in Section 3.3 that alternative
coupling topologies give rise to different dynamical
behaviours. So the issue here is not to question or under‐
mine the enactive stance on representations, but simply to
adopt the position (i) that information correlating with
properties of the external environment (sensorimotor
traces, for example) may be retained within the structure of
a unity, (ii) that such information can be regarded as a form
of ’memory’, (iii) that such information could act as a prior
on the dynamics of interaction (that is, it might exert an
influence on the attractor landscape) and (iv) that such
information could be of some ecological value to the unity.
As an example of the latter, sensorimotor information
retained in memory may be exploited by a unity for various
practical purposes, such as perception (the recognition of
previously encountered sensorimotor events and scenar‐
ios), action (the efficient re-use of learnt sensorimotor
behaviours) and prediction (the planning and optimization
of future sensorimotor states prior to their enaction). These
are all examples of inference.
Given this perspective, the degree to which perception,
action and prediction take place, and the consequences for
the coupled behaviour of a unity, is very much conditional
on the fidelity and depth of the information that is retained:
the larger and more detailed the memory, the higher the
potential for successful outcomes. For example, even a
simple spatiotemporal memory of some aspects of the
external environment could, depending on its scope,
facilitate a modest ability to recognize previously encoun‐
tered locations and situations. Likewise, it would permit
interaction with, and navigation of, the environment, as
well as an ability to anticipate its dynamics (which could
be crucial in situations where progress towards an intended
goal cannot be readily evaluated).
In terms of the visual language being developed here, it is
proposed that information that is retained within the
cognitive unity is simply depicted as a pictogram contained
within a unity’s central nervous system. Hence, spatiotem‐
poral memory can be illustrated by placing the pictogram
for a unity’s external environment (a wavy line) inside a
unity’s cognitive loop. This is illustrated in Figure 15a.
Beyond simple spatiotemporal memory, the next level of
representational complexity would seem to be the decom‐
position (in memory) of the external environment into
independent and semi-independent entities. This would
facilitate an ability to distinguish between different objects
in the environment, including other unities. It would also
facilitate an ability to emulate the directly observable surface
behaviours5 of other unities, thereby opening up the
possibility of recognizing their identities, as well as
anticipating their behaviours (albeit to a degree limited by
the surface representation). The main advantage would be
a dramatic increase in a unity’s ability to generalize due to
the combinatorial properties of the representational state-
space arising from the decomposition.
4 Interestingly, the world’s most successful commercial robot is iRobot’s Roomba robot vacuum cleaner, which employs a non-representational behaviour-
based ’subsumption’ architecture.
5 A surface representation means that there is no explicit information relating to inferred hidden states or variables.
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The ability to emulate the surface behaviour of another
unity may be depicted by placing the pictogram for a
second-order unity (see Section 2.2) inside a unity’s
cognitive loop. Furthermore, in order to make it clear that
this is a representation of an external unity (that is, a
representation of ’other’ not ’self’), the inserted pictogram
may be shown with dotted rather than solid lines. This is
illustrated in Figure 15b.
Following on from emulating the surface behaviours of
other unities, the third stage of representational complexity
would seem to be the imputation of their internal states. In
particular, this would relate to the attribution of motives
and intentions to other unities - taking an ’intentional
stance’ [35]. It would also encompass the inference of
affective states [36]. Again, such a step-up in representa‐
tional complexity would confer significant operational
advantages (for example, the ability to perform action
understanding by inferring the intentions of another unity).
Successful inference of another unity’s internal states could
be regarded as the manifestation of ’empathy’, which is
illustrated by placing the pictogram for a third-order unity
(see Section 2.3) inside a unity’s cognitive loop. Again, since
this is a representation of ’other’ not ’self’, the inserted
pictogram may be depicted with dotted lines, as illustrated
in Figure 15c.
Stepping up from imputing hidden variables, such as
intentions and affective states, the fourth stage of repre‐
sentational complexity would seem to be the ability of one
unity to model another unity with the potential effect of
having a different perspective on the world from itself - a
facility commonly referred to as ’Theory of Mind’ (ToM)
[37]. In order to do this, a unity would need to be able to
infer the beliefs of another unity [38]. Armed with this
information (represented in memory), a unity would then
have the potential to exploit it in order to update its own
beliefs and satisfy its own needs, desires and intentions.
The key difference between this arrangement and the three
previous levels of representational complexity is that, in
this configuration, the information embedded in memory
not only incorporates an estimate of another unity’s
internal states, but also includes the context in which the
other unity exists. In other words, such a unity would be in
a position to model another unity as inhabiting a different
environment from itself. This is illustrated by placing the
pictogram for a third-order unity and its environment inside
a unity’s cognitive loop, as shown in Figure 15d.
As a final step, it is clear that the stages of representational
fidelity proposed thus far lead to the possibility of a
recursive arrangement, in which a unity’s model of another
unity could itself include internal representations (and so
on ad infinitum). For example, a unity could represent
another unity as having a model of the first unity (as
illustrated in Figure 15e). Such a configuration - commonly
referred to as ’recursive mind reading’ - would have a
dramatic effect on the efficiency of the coupling between
unities.
the inserted pictogram may be depicted with dotted lines
as illustrated in Figure 15c.
Stepping-up from imputing hidden variables such as
intentions and affective states, the fourth stage of
representational complexity would seem to be the ability
of one unity to model another unity as potentially having
a different perspective on the world from itself - a facility
commonly referred to as ‘Theory-of-Mind’ (ToM) [37]. In
order to do this, a unity would need to be able to infer the
beliefs of another unity [38]. Armed with this information
(represented in memory), a unity would then have the
potential to exploit it in order to update their own beliefs
and to satisfy their own needs, desires and i tenti ns.
The key difference between this arrangement and the
three previous levels of represe tati nal complexity is
that in this configuration the information embedded in
memory not only incorporates an estimate of another
unity’s internal states, but also includes the context in
which the other unity exists. In other words, such a
unity would be in a position to model another unity as
inhabiting a different environment from itself. This is
illustrated by placing the pictogram for a third-order unity
and its environment inside a unity’s cognitive loop as shown
in Figure 15d.
As a final step, it is clear that the stages of representational
fid lity proposed thus far lead to the possibility of a
recursive arrangement in which a unity’s model of another
unity could itself include internal representations (and so
on ad infinitem). For example, a unity could represent
another unity as having a model of the first unity (as
illustrated in Figure 15e). Such a configuration - commonly
referred to as ‘recursive mind-reading’ - would have a
dramatic effect on the efficiency of the coupling between
unities.
It is interesting to appreciate that the series of pictograms
shown in Figure 15 is not simply the outcome of the
preceding arg ments. Rather, the constraints imposed
by the developing visual language help significantly in
clarifying the logical progression of concepts that has
been developed here. The rather satisfying outcome is
th t he pict grams illustrate in a succinct form how
and why each step-up in representational complexity
helps make a unity’s external environment easier to
understand, easier to navigate and easier to predict (where
“easier” implies more accurate and/or more effective
and/or faster). The pictographs thus make it clear how
the incr asing represe tational complexity would confer
significant adaptive benefit to natural living systems as
well as providing an effective blueprint for designing and
implementing artificial cognitive agents such as robots
with different deg ees of ‘social i telligence’ [39, 40].
3.8. Advanced interactivity
The possibility of different degrees of representational
complexity (as discussed in the previous section) leads
to the realisation that each level has implications, not
only for the ability of one unity to understand and
predict the behaviour of another, but also for the quality
an type of coupling that could emerge between unities.
For example, interacting unities that possess information
(a)	   (b)	   (c)	  
(d)	   (e)	  
Figure 15. Illustration of internal representations of increasing
fidelity: (a) spatiotemporal memory: representation of a unity’s
external environment, (b) emulation: representation of another
unity’s directly observable surface behaviour, (c) empathy:
representation of another unity’s internal intentions and/or
affective states, (d) Theory of Mind: representation of another
unity’s different perspective and (e) recursive mind-reading:
representation of another unity’s model of the first unity. In each
case, ‘self’ (and self’s environment) is depicted using solid lines
and ‘other’ (and other’s environment) is depicted using broken
lines.
relating to each other’s externally observable behaviour
would have the potential to exploit such information to
optimise the coordination of their joint physical actions6.
On the other hand, unities possessing representations of
each other’s internal intentions and/or affective states
would be able to exploit such information to achieve
more effective behavioural alignment through empathic
coupling. Likewise, interacting unities possessing ToM
would be able to exploit deception in their repertoire of
behaviours, and those capable of recursive mind-reading
would be able to sustain high information-rate interactions
via much lower bandwidth sensorimotor channels (this is
taken up in Section 3.9).
In general, shared representations facilitate coordinated
behaviour7 [41, 42], so the quality and type of the
shared information would have a direct impact on the
6 Note that joint behaviour could be cooperative or competitive.
7 This does not imply that such optimisation can only be achieved through
explicit cognitive processes. It could also arise from the conditioning
effect of such information on the location of the attractors in the
state-space of the dynamically coupled system.
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Figure 15. Illustration of internal representations of increasing fidelity: (a)
spatiotempo al memory: representation of a unity’s external e vironment; (b)
emulation: representation of another unity’s directly observable surface
behaviour; (c) empathy: representation of another unity’s internal intentions
and/or affective states; (d) ToM: representation of another unity’s different
perspective; and (e) recursive mind readi g: representation of another unity’s
model of the first unity. In each case, ’self’ (and self’s environment) is
depicted using solid lines and ’other’ (and other’s environment) is depicted
using broken lines.
It is interesting to appreciate that the series of pictograms
shown in Figure 15 is not simply the outcome of the
preceding arguments. Rather, the constraints imposed by
the developing visual language help significantly in
clarifying th  logical progres ion of concepts th t has been
developed here. The rather satisfying outcome is that the
pictograms illustrate, in a succinct form, how and why each
step-up in representational c mplexity helps make a
unity’s external environment easier t  underst nd, easier
to navigate and easier to predict (where ”easier” implies
more accurate and/or more effective and/or faster). The
pictographs, then, make it clear how the increasing
representational complexity would confer significant
adaptive benefit to natural living systems, as well as
provide an effective blueprint for designing and imple‐
menting artificial cognitive agents, such as robots with
different degrees of ’social intellige ce’ [39, 40].
3.8 Advanced interactivity
The possibility of different degrees of representational
complexity (as discussed in the previous section) leads to
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the realization that each level has implications, not only for
the ability of one unity to understand and predict the
behaviour of another, but also for the quality and type of
coupling that could emerge between unities. For example,
interacting unities, which possess information relating to
each other’s externally observable behaviour, would have
the potential to exploit such information in order to
optimize the coordination of their joint physical actions6.
On the other hand, unities possessing representations of
each other’s internal intentions and/or affective states
would be able to exploit such information in order to
achieve more effective behavioural alignment through
empathic coupling. Likewise, interacting unities possess‐
ing ToM would be able to exploit deception in their reper‐
toire of behaviours, while those capable of recursive mind
reading would be able to sustain high information rate
interactions via much lower bandwidth sensorimotor
channels (this is taken up in Section 3.9).
In general, shared representations facilitate coordinated
behaviour7 [41, 42], so the quality and type of the shared
information would have a direct impact on the resulting
emergent behaviours. This, in turn, would depend on the
fidelity and complexity of the internal representations:
from physical interaction conditional on observable surface
behaviours to empathic interaction conditional on inferred
intentions and/or affective states, to ToM-based interaction
conditional on inferred beliefs and to interaction condi‐
tional on recursive mind reading. Similarly, the degree to
which behaviours such as alignment and learning through
imitation are successful will be conditional on the level and
fidelity of the shared representations [43, 44, 45]. Indeed,
the notion that shared representations capture aspects of
joint histories and mutual experiences has already been
shown to be important in human-robot interaction [46, 47].
Each of these scenarios may be captured by suitable
pairings of the relevant pictograms shown in Figure 15 (and
their machine counterparts).
Interestingly, the developing visual language not only
illuminates the possibility of different degrees of coupling
between unities, but it also leads to an understanding that
the most advanced forms of interactivity involve recursive
mind reading between matched conspecifics8. Indeed, it
can be seen that each level represents a form of predictive
coding [48, 49], with recursive mind reading providing the
highest quality predictors and, in turn, facilitating the
highest information rate coupling, given a particular set of
low information rate sensorimotor channels. Also, the
pictograms are able to clarify that senders and receivers
may employ directed intentional/attentional behaviour
(see Section 3.4), which means that the highest level of
coupling would seem to be ostensive-inferential commu‐
nicative interaction incorporating recursive mind reading
- this is a definition of language [50]!
3.9 Languaging
The  foregoing  section  makes  a  compelling  argument
(based  on  the  developing  pictographic  taxonomy)  that
ostensive-inferential coupling, founded on recursive mind
reading,  facilitates  coordinated  behaviour  between
matched unities,  which can be  reasonably  termed ’lan‐
guaging’ [51, 52]. Indeed, the discussion thus far ties
together  a  variety  of  contemporary  perspectives  on
language  as  an  interaction  system  [53]  (especially  in
human-robot interaction [54]), the importance of ToM and
predictive models for language behaviour [55, 56, 57], and
the power of a shared narrative [58].
This general idea can now be linked with the concepts
developed in Section 3.3 with regard to direct, indirect and
reflective action to create an interesting connection with
speech act theory [59]. Direct languaging is equivalent to
a ’declarative’ speech act (for example, ”Here is some food.”:
an informative linguistic action), reflective languaging
corresponds to an ’interrogative’ speech act (for exam‐
ple, ”Where is the food?”: a linguistic action that is intended
to elicit an informative linguistic or non-linguistic re‐
sponse) and indirect languaging corresponds to an an ’im‐
perative’ speech act (for example, ”Get me some food!”: a
linguistic action that is intended to elicit an appropriate
physical action).
Figure 16. Illustration of conversational interaction (dialogue) using a
combination of all three forms of ostensive behaviour (illustrated in Figure
14) to establish language-based coupling between two interlocutors. One
unity (and its environment) is depicted using solid lines and the other unity
(and its environment) is depicted using broken lines. As can be seen,
communicative interaction is founded on two-way recursive mind reading.
In practice, all three forms of speech act may be employed
in a mutual two-way communicative coupling between
linguistically-enabled unities. The resulting behaviour is,
6 Note that joint behaviour could be cooperative or competitive.
7 This does not imply that such optimization can only be achieved through explicit cognitive processes. It could also arise from the conditioning effect of such
information on the location of the attractors in the state-space of the dynamically coupled system.
8 It is assumed here that participants in an interaction are matched in their abilities and that shared representations are balanced in some sense. In general,
this is not necessarily true - especially when living systems interact with artificial systems. The implications of mismatched abilities are discussed in Section
3.10.
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of course, commonly referred to as ’dialogue’ (conversa‐
tional interaction) and it is possible to invoke a combined
pictogram to reflect the richness of such coupling between
interlocutors - see Figure 16. Furthermore, because of its
enactive roots, the pictographic representation emphasizes
dialogue as distributed sense-making [60, 61] across a
dynamical system [62] (in contrast to the more traditional
view of dialogue as message-passing within a strict turn-
taking framework).
3.10. Human-animal-robot interaction
Much of the latter discussion has referred to unities without
regard to whether they are natural or artificial (or hybrids),
while the majority of the illustrations have used pictograms
that suggest living organisms9. Moreover, in the sections on
interactivity, there has been an implicit assumption that
interacting unities are matched in their structures and
capabilities. The next step is to break away from this
premise and consider situations where interactivity occurs
between mismatched unities, such as between humans and
animals, or between natural unities and artificial agents.
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Figure 17. Illustration of the coupling between (a) humans and animals, (b)
humans and robots, and (c) animals and robots. In each case, the pictograms
make it clear that the mismatch in structures and capabilities will have
important implications for the nature and type of interactions that can take
place. In these particular examples, the animals and robots are depicted as
not possessing a ToM (although, for animals, this is a controversial topic [63,
64]).
Several of these mismatched conditions are illustrated in
Figure  17.  As  can  be  seen,  the  pictographic  language
developed thus far is easily extended to cover the interac‐
tions between humans and animals, between humans and
robots, and between animals and robots. What is interest‐
ing is that the implications of such mismatched scenarios
are immediately made clear; for example, as discussed in
Section 3.7, a human being naturally ascribes intentions to
an animal or a robot, even though they may in reality possess
no such abilities. Likewise, animal-robot interaction is, by
necessity, conditional on surface physical behaviours alone.
Such mismatched situations go some way to explain the
difficulties  that  are  often  encountered  in  human-robot
interaction, while the pictograms make explicit some of the
challenges that need to be addressed [65].
Of particular interest is whether the emerging visual
taxonomy offers any interesting insights into language-
based interaction between a human being and a cognitive
robot. Based on the pictographic representations devel‐
oped so far, Figure 18 illustrates the required configuration
and, as can be seen, the implication is that such an arrange‐
ment will only function properly if both partners (the
human and the robot) exploit ostensive-inferential recur‐
sive mind reading. Since such abilities are beyond the
capabilities of state-of-the-art robots and autonomous
agents, this might serve to explain the somewhat primitive
nature of contemporary language-based human-robot
interaction [66]. It also explains why it is not appropriate to
simply take off-the-shelf speech technology components
(automatic speech recognizers, speech synthesizers and
dialogue systems) and merely interface them with a mobile
robotic platform; the integration must be much deeper if it
is to be effective [67].
Figure 18. Illustration of language-based interaction between a human being
and a cognitive robot. As in Figure 16, communicative interaction is founded
on two-way recursive mind reading.
Indeed, the immense mismatch between the cognitive,
behavioural and linguistic capabilities of human beings
and those possessed by even the most advanced artificial
cognitive systems, coupled with human beings’ propensity
to deploy a complex ToM perspective when dealing with
interactive agents, underpins the importance of providing
artificial systems with some degree of visual, vocal and
behavioural coherence, if the interaction is to be at all
effective [68, 69, 70]. Indeed, if such coherence is not the
subject of careful and balanced design, then there is a real
9 It is hoped that the reader has been mentally mapping the pictograms onto the corresponding artificial forms and considering the implications for advanced
robotic systems.
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danger of inadvertently creating the conditions under
which the human user will fall into the ’uncanny valley’
[71] and reject the system, due to an inability to accommo‐
date its anomalous behaviours [72, 73, 74].
3.11. Self-awareness
Finally (and with the risk of entering into difficult and
controversial territory), it is possible to use the visual
language being developed here to address the enigmatic
issue of self-awareness: the sense of agency and conscious‐
ness [75, 76, 77]. For example, it has already been argued
(in Section 3.7) that memory may be used to store repre‐
sentations of increasing degrees of complexity, which can
contribute to increasing levels of efficiency in a unity’s
ability to interact with its external environment (including
other unities). However, the representations thus far have
been concerned with the fidelity of stored information
pertaining to other, whereas the same arguments may be
made with respect to the fidelity of stored information
pertaining to self.
This raises an obvious philosophical question: if, by virtue
of its existence, a unity already has access to information
about itself, why (as is argued by enactive and radical
embodied theories of cognition [78]) would it need to
invoke an additional representation of itself? The answer,
emerging from the insights created by the visual language
being developed here (and tying in with contemporary
views on the role of predictive processing in linking
exteroceptive and interoceptive perceptions [79, 80]) is that
such internal representations have predictive power. That is,
a representation may be used to explore ”What if?” scenar‐
ios prior to committing the organism to some, potentially
catastrophic, action. Hence, a unity that has an ability to
simulate itself would be in a position to imagine itself in
different spatiotemporal contexts (that is, different times or
places)10. Such a situation is illustrated in Figure 19a.
In addition, by following the line of argument developed
in Section 3.7 with respect to recursive mind reading, it is
possible to hypothesize a configuration in which the
representation of self could itself contain a representation
of self (and so on). Such an arrangement would facilitate an
ability for a unity to think about itself thinking about itself
thinking about... (and so on). This situation is illustrated in
Figure 19b.
Turning now to the concepts developed in Section 3.9, the
visual language suggests that it would be possible to invoke
internal representations of self based on ostensive-inferen‐
tial recursive mind reading. In other words, the pictograms
make it clear that it would be possible to invoke language
as a linearized abstracted internal communications channel
with a high information rate between self and self. If such
an arrangement involves dialogue between self and
simulated self, then this represents (literally) talking to
oneself. If the configuration involves communication
between simulated self and simulated self, then this would
correspond to an internal dialogue11. The latter configura‐
tion is illustrated in Figure 19c.
These perspectives on ’representation’ align well with the
latest thinking in cognitive science, where it is now being
argued that ”trying to suppress the notion of representation...
is seriously misguided” [81].
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Figure 19. Illustration of different types of self-awareness: (a) a unity
imagining itself in a different context, (b) a unity thinking about itself
thinking about itself thinking and (c) a unity holding an internal dialogue
with itself
Finally, it is clear that all these configurations call for some
kind of workspace in order for a unity to be able to run
the ’What if?’ simulations; this would seem to require a
consolidated approach across different sensorimotor
capabilities, if optimal solutions are to be discovered. Such
a perspective appears to tie in closely with ’Global Work‐
space Theory’ (GWT) [82] and, in turn, with contemporary
theories concerning consciousness [83, 84].
4. Discussion
The invention of external aids, such as visualization to
amplify our natural cognitive capacity to comprehend
obscure and complex information, is a ubiquitous feature
of human endeavour [85, 86]. In the same spirit, the
pictographic language developed in this paper does appear
to facilitate tantalizing glimpses into some of the most
difficult challenges facing the fields of cognitive science and
cognitive systems. In line with Maturana and Varela’s
original pictograms (Figures 1-4), the extensions presented
here are remarkably simple in design. Nevertheless,
potentially valuable insights emerge, precisely because of
the clarity injected by the use of such straightforward
graphical devices.
10 Indeed, a unity could even imagine itself as a different self.
11 For example, mentally telling oneself to do something or creating an internal narrative account of self (a configuration that Maturana hypothesized as the
seat of consciousness).
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4.1 Related work
The approach presented here is reminiscent of von Neu‐
mann’s attempt to introduce a logic of self-reproduction
[87], as well as more recent attempts to taxonomize the
structure of self-sustaining systems in diagrammatic form,
such as the ’operator hierarchy’ developed by Jagers op
Akkerhuis [88]. Although superficially similar to the
scheme presented here, Jagers op Akkerhuis’ pictographic
representations are primarily concerned with capturing the
evolution of living systems, particularly at the cellular level.
His pictograms do not offer any special insights into
interactive behaviour, especially at the cognitive level or
with respect to empathy, ToM or language. However his
concept of a ’memon’ (characterized by an organism’s
possession of a neural network) as the most complex
organizational ’closure’12 is interesting, as he uses his
scheme to predict that technical memons (as opposed to
animal memons) are likely to provide the next step in the
evolution of life on our planet: ”a conclusion that tears down
the walls between biology and robotics and places artificial
intelligence at the heart of evolution on earth” [89].
Furthermore, the informational perspective developed
here appears to be highly compatible with the notion of
emergent representation as introduced in the ’Interactivist’
framework [90]. In particular, Bickhard [91] proposed a
number of (unordered) levels of representation, several of
which map directly onto the scheme proposed here.
However, the present analysis reveals a number of inter‐
esting issues not addressed by Bickhard. For example,
Bickhard nominates intentionality as the first level of
representation, but does not take into consideration the
position adopted here that the intentional stance only
makes sense in relation to some aspect of the external
environment. Moreover, somewhat surprisingly, Bickhard
does not address ToM.
In the field of social robotics, Dautenhahn has employed
pictographic illustrations in order to convey some of the
core concepts in social intelligence, problem-solving and
empathy [39, 40]. Likewise, Ziemke [92] and Vernon [93]
provide somewhat visual approaches to modelling ’higher
level’ cognition. However, none of these visualization
schemes aspires to provide a comprehensive pictographic
language of the form described in this paper.
4.2 Use in teaching and learning
As well as being an exercise in attempting to understand
complex issues in the organization and behaviour of living
and non-living systems, it is important to note that the
pictographic language presented in this paper was origi‐
nally developed in order to clarify such issues in the context
of teaching and learning. The pictograms were initially
constructed for a university second-year undergraduate
course on bio-inspired computing and robotics in a high-
ranking computer science department, specifically in order
to help the students assimilate key concepts introduced in
four hours of lectures on ’cognition’ and ’interaction’. The
course has been running in this form for several years and
feedback from the students has been very positive. In
particular, the course attendees are appreciative of the
integrative nature of the visual language, allowing a wide
range of topics to be linked together within a single
conceptual framework.
This positive experience in teaching and learning under‐
lines the value of providing a systematic classification of
cognitive systems. Even though, by its simplifying nature,
such a taxonomy inevitably has some limitations (ad‐
dressed below), it can nevertheless provide students and
researchers with a clear frame of reference for understand‐
ing such complex systems.
4.3 Limitations
Of course, it is only possible to go so far in capturing
complex conceptual issues in simple pictographic repre‐
sentations. Such an approach is, by its very nature, bound
to result in crude approximations, high-level abstractions
and the potential omission of important details. There are
real dangers that the intuitions implicit in the pictograms
may be ill-founded or plain wrong, thereby causing
confusion and misunderstanding rather than clarification
and insight13.
It is also not clear to what extent such an approach might
help in designing the specifics of any particular system. For
example, the internal representations depicted in Section
3.7 onwards sidestep precise details about how the differ‐
ent representations impact on perception and action.
Likewise, the pictographs illustrated in Figures 16 and 18
say little about the special ’particulate’ (combinatorial)
structure of speech and language [94].
Taking a more general perspective, these potential difficul‐
ties are well-established problems in the philosophy of
science [95]; there are always open questions regarding (i)
the explanatory power of a selected scientific model, (ii) the
risks associated with taking a reductionist stance and (iii)
the assumptions that have to be made in order to facilitate
progress. Aware of these issues, the approach taken here
has attempted to be pan-theoretic, drawing on a wide cross-
section of relevant literature and addressing head-on some
of the more controversial issues (such as cognitive repre‐
sentations, which are discussed in Section 3.7). Care has
also been taken to position the visual language, such that it
is sufficiently general in order to avoid any major concep‐
tual pitfalls whilst being sufficiently precise that it captures
12 A ’closure’ in Jagers op Akkerhuis’ operator hierarchy is somewhat analogous to a ’unity’ in Maturana and Varela’s scheme.
13 There are even potential problems with Maturana and Varela’s original pictograms; for example, it has been debated whether a nervous system is actually
autopoietic and, therefore, deserving of the two arrows depicted on the inner ellipse in Figure 3.
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specific instances of complex configurations. Indeed, the
fact that a number of important insights has emerged, as a
direct consequence of designing the various pictograms,
provides evidence that the scheme does appear to provide
a parsimonious account of a wide range of important issues
without committing too many sins.
4.4 Implications for advanced robotic systems
Although relatively few examples have been given of non-
living systems (due to the development of the pictographic
taxonomy taking primary inspiration from the behaviours
of living organisms), the concepts portrayed in Sections 3.3
to 3.9 are of equal relevance to robotic systems. For exam‐
ple, the different arrangements for connectivity within a
community of cognitive agents portrayed in Figure 8
would map directly onto equivalent topologies in swarm
robotics (and illustrated with the appropriate machine-like
pictograms).
In a similar way, the different types of active/passive
signalling illustrated in Figure 10 and Figure 11, if redrawn
for non-living systems, would serve to clarify some of the
issues that need to be considered when designing, imple‐
menting and operating a robot’s sensors and actuators.
Likewise, the different classes of intentional behaviour
portrayed in Figure 13 (and shown in action in Figure 14)
also apply directly to robotic systems and focus awareness
on the degree of autonomy that such systems actually have.
Finally, the depictions in Figure 15 and Figure 19 of the
value and power of internal representations of increasing
fidelity (including self-awareness) have important impli‐
cations for advanced robotic systems. For example,
Winfield [96] has argued that self-awareness will lead to
enhanced safety in physical human-robot interaction and,
ultimately, toward ethical behaviour in autonomous
robots.
Overall, the pictographic language developed here facili‐
tates the visualization of a huge array of complex arrange‐
ments involving both living and non-living systems (and
their environments). Its value lies in the ease with which
key conceptual issues are brought to the fore: a feature that
should prove immensely useful in the design and imple‐
mentation of future advanced robotic systems. In particu‐
lar, it should serve to raise pertinent issues in the mind of
a robot system designer (for example, with respect to
different aspects of biological agency/autonomy), as well
as facilitate clearer thinking about the broad conceptual
issues involved, notwithstanding the limitations discussed
above.
4.5 Possible extensions
The previous sections have touched on a wide variety of
contemporary topics in cognitive science and cognitive
systems; however, there are many aspects of the structure
and behaviour of natural/artificial systems that have yet to
be addressed. For example, there would be great value in
teasing apart the different dimensions associated with the
familiar, yet surprisingly ill-defined, notion of ’intelli‐
gence’. Useful starting points in this area could be the
evolutionary perspective proposed by Mithin [97] or
decomposition as outlined by Winfield [98]. However, it is
unclear how such concepts might be depicted pictograph‐
ically.
Likewise, the visual language developed thus far does not
capture the morphological complexity of different unities.
Clearly the number of degrees of freedom associated with
the physical ’body’ of a unity heavily determines its ability
to interact with its external environment (including other
unities), but a satisfactory way of handling this pictograph‐
ically has yet to be worked out14. In addition, the current
visual language does not distinguish between different
sensorimotor modalities for interaction and communica‐
tion.
Other topics worthy of investigation (in the context of
designing suitable pictographic representations) are:
• teleoperated robots (that is, a person-machine metacellular
organization in which one is in direct control of the
other);
• intelligent virtual agents (that is, non-embodied agents
such as an avatar or Apple’s Siri);
• emotion (a representation of internal states, such as
illustrating a location in the classic 3-D space comprising
valence, arousal and dominance [99] and their relevance
to human-robot interaction [100, 101]);
• learning (either ontogenetically during its own develop‐
mental life cycle [102] or phylogenetically as a commun‐
ity evolves over time [103]);
• centralized versus distributed unities (unlike natural
systems, artificial systems and hybrids are not confined
to local connectivity);
• intrinsic motivations (the representation of internal
drives, needs, beliefs, desires and intentions [38, 104,
105]);
• homeostatic control (the regulatory mechanisms required
to maintain preferred internal/external states [106, 107]);
and
• affordances (the notion that the coupling between a unity
and its environment is fundamentally conditional on the
characteristics of both [108, 109]).
Finally, it has been suggested15 that there may be value in
animating the pictograms to illustrate some of the dynam‐
14 One possibility is to use the number of sides on a unity to indicate the number of degrees of freedom (on the basis that a living system has a huge number
and hence warrants a circle), but this would not adequately capture the decomposition of a unity into coupled (symbiotic) elements.
15 by interested colleagues
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ics. This could be a very valuable extension; for example,
expanding upon Heider and Simmel’s famous hand-
crafted stop-motion cartoon in order to illustrate apparent
intentionality between simple agents [110].
5. Conclusion
This paper has introduced a set of putative extensions to
Maturana and Varela’s original pictographic depictions of
autopoietic unities to create a rich visual language for
envisioning a wide range of enactive systems - natural or
artificial - with different degrees of complexity. Originally
developed for teaching purposes, it has been shown how
such a diagrammatic taxonomy may be used to illustrate a
remarkable range of advanced configurations (such as
hybrid systems, swarm topologies, intentionality, commu‐
nicative behaviour, empathy, ToM, languaging, human-
animal-robot interaction and self-awareness).
As well as drawing on a large cross-section of relevant
literature, the research has attempted to take a pan-
theoretic perspective. As a consequence, a number of
interesting insights has emerged; not only does the visual
taxonomy reveal the paucity of many current approaches,
but it also appears to provide a parsimonious depiction of
a wide range of important research questions, many of
which have implications for our understanding of cogni‐
tion as well as the effective design and implementation of
future cognitive systems (such as robots).
As a language, the pictographic taxonomy has expressive
power, so there are many combinations of symbols whose
implications are yet to be explored. It is hoped, therefore,
that other researchers will not only find value in the
existing framework, but will also explore its potential and
contribute appropriate extensions and improvements.
The author has found the pictographic language very
useful for teaching and learning within his own institution.
However, the test of the utility of such a taxonomy is
whether it is sufficiently intuitive, consistent and helpful in
order for it to be embraced by the wider research commun‐
ity. To that end, a glossary of pictographic components is
included as an addendum16. It is intended that this may be
used as a ’quick reference’ guide, in exactly the same way
as a sheet of circuit symbols aids electronic systems design.
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Appendix
Glossary	  of	  Pictograms	  for	  Enac2ve	  Systems	  
ARTIFICIAL	  
BIO	  
IMPLANT	  
50:50	  
HYBRID	  
PROSTHETIC	  
NATURAL	  
PHYSICAL	   NEURAL	  
skins	   bodies	   brains	   reps.	  
X
X
X
X
X
UNITIES	  
SURROUNDING	  
ENVIRONMENTS	  
ADJACENT	  
INTERACTION	  
PASSIVE	  
AC
TI
VE
	  
direct	  
reﬂec2ve	  
indirect	  
COUPLED	  
AUTOPOIESIS	  
DISTINCT	  ENTITIES	  
U
N
IT
IE
S	   self/other	  
other/self	  
here/there	  
EN
VI
RO
N
M
EN
TS
	  
there/here	  
EXAMPLE	  
LANGUAGE-­‐BASED	  INTERACTION	  BETWEEN	  A	  HUMAN	  BEING	  
AND	  A	  COGNITIVE	  ROBOT	  (BOTH	  WITH	  ‘THEORY	  OF	  MIND’)	  
http://www.dcs.shef.ac.uk/~roger/glossary.pdf
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